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In a two-country world economy, consumption-habit dynamics in one coun-
try are aﬀected, due to endogenous interest rate adjustments, by the other
country’s habits and preferences. External indebtedness depends crucially
on international diﬀerences in habit-adjusted net output less habitual living
standard. Interest rate adjustments enlarge the consumption impact of an
income shock. Consistently with the empirical facts, the habit parameter
of a large country, therefore, would be underestimated, and the current ac-
count volatility overestimated, if estimated using a small-country model. An
increase in ﬁscal spending in one country can beneﬁt the country and harm
the neighbor due to intertemporal terms-of-trade eﬀects.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers:F 4 1 ,D 9 0 .
Keywords: Habit formation, two country model, immiserizing growth.1 Introduction
An important stylized fact is that consumers’ habit forming behavior has a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on intertemporal choices, and hence macroeconomic phe-
nomena (e.g., Constantinides, 1990, Campbell and Cochrane, 1999, Car-
roll et.al., 2000, Díaz et.al., 2003). Accordingly, there have been numerous
attempts to better understand open-macroeconomic phenomena by incor-
porating habit formation. For example, by introducing consumers’ habit-
persistent behavior to small-country models, Mansoorian (1993a, b) and
Ikeda and Gombi (1999) derive its implications for current account dynamics
and macroeconomic policies. Gruber (2002) provides empirical support to an
“intertemporal current account model” with habit formation as explaining
the actual current account behavior of the G-7 countries.
However, in the existing studies, including those small-country analyses,
habit formation is examined within the representative-agent framework, in
which consumers’ interactions due to pecuniary externalities are completely
neglected. When the interest rate is endogenously determined in a world
economy with two heterogeneous agents (countries), one consumer’s (or coun-
try’s) habit forming behavior is aﬀected by other consumers’ (or countries’)
habits and preferences. It has a particular importance to examine how this
produces diﬀerent (or same) results from what the literature has, theoret-
ically or empirically, predicted using small-country and/or representative-
agent models; and to ﬁgure out what kind of bias would arise when a large
country’s consumption behavior is estimated by using a small-country model.
The two-country analysis would also enable us to investigate how habit for-
mation in consumption aﬀects each consumer’s (country’s) long-run indebt-
edness and the transmission mechanism of various policies.
This paper presents a tractable two-country world economy model with
heterogeneous habit forming consumers. The purposes of the paper are: (i) to
describe interactive habit-forming consumer behavior in a world economy; (ii)
to examine long-run external indebtedness; (iii) to address how ﬁscal policies
in one country aﬀect the two countries’ consumptions, wealth holdings, and
welfare levels; and (iv) to ﬁgure out empirical implications. Issues (ii) and (iii)
are also examined by Devereux and Shi (1991) by using a variable discount
rate model with capital accumulation.1 At the cost of assuming away capital
1The other literature concerning two-country dynamic models include Turnovsky and
Bianconi (1992), Kalayalcin (1996), and Bianconi and Turnovsky (1997), which focus
on supply side adjustments such as capital accumulation and/or leisure/labor choice. See
1accumulation, our main interest is to focus on habit formation as a more
empirically relevant component of the macroeconomic adjustment process.
Under habit formation, consumption dynamics depend crucially on in-
tertemporal complementarities. For example, when the marginal utility of
consumption is strongly and positively related to habits, which Ryder and
Heal (1973) designate adjacent complementarity, optimum consumption is
tied tightly to and comoves positively with current habits. When there are
heterogeneous consumers or countries, the behavior of individual consumers
is aﬀected by other consumers’ habits and preferences, as well as their own,
due to interest rate adjustments. Equilibrium intertemporal complementarity
in consumption can thus diﬀer from what is deﬁned by individual consumers’
subjective preferences.
To examine habit forming consumer behavior in an interdependent world
economy, we propose to simplify the general equilibrium system by using
two aggregations. First, we construct a world felicity function from both
countries’ felicity functions. One appealing aspect of this approach is the
ability to thereby characterize intertemporal complementarity in each coun-
try’s equilibrium consumption in a similar way as in the small-country case.
Even though habit preferences in one country display distant (resp. adjacent)
complementarity, its equilibrium consumption behavior may exhibit adjacent
(resp. distant) complementarity. A corollary is that even if one country has
no preference for habits, the time series of consumption rates will display
habit-persistent patterns.
Second, we deﬁne an aggregate habit capital as the sum of individual
countries’ habit capitals. When aggregate output is constant, the aggregate
habit capital is also constant since, from the market clearing condition, it
equals aggregate output. When aggregate output changes at a point in time
due to exogenous shocks, the aggregate habit formation aﬀects consumption
dynamics as an additional dynamic source. The resultant consumption be-
havior in each country is then aﬀected by the aggregate habit capital, as well
as its own habit capital.
We characterize long-run external indebtedness by deﬁning the eﬀective
net output that can be allocated for saving under habit formation as surplus
income. It is shown that a country is more likely to be a long-run creditor
the larger surplus income it has. Surplus income depends on net output (i.e.,
also Ikeda and Ono (1991) for an analysis of non-monotonic multi-country dynamics under
heterogeneous consumer preferences.
2output income less government spending), the initial stock of habit capital,
and the strength of adjacent complementarity. When a country’s net output
is larger (resp. smaller) than its habitual consumption level, we show that
the country has larger (resp. smaller) surplus income and hence is more
likely to be a creditor (debtor), the stronger adjacent complementarity it
exhibits. This result is shown to be consistent with the usual proposition
that a country tends to be a long-run creditor the more patience it has. The
novelty of this paper is that which country is more patient depends on the
relative strengths of adjacent complementarity and on how much greater net
output than the habitual consumption standard they have.2
We address macroeconomic adjustments in response to an increase in
country H’s ﬁscal spending ﬁnanced with lump-sum taxes. As shown in the
literature (see, e.g., Mansoorian 1993a, b), in the small-country case, nega-
tive income shocks, such as an increase in ﬁscal spending, necessarily lowers
both initial and steady-state consumption levels; and decreases (resp. in-
creases) net foreign assets under adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity.
By assuming that the initial holding of net foreign assets, and hence the in-
come re-transfer eﬀect due to interest rate changes are negligible, we show
that an increase in a country’s ﬁscal spending (i) can increase the initial
or steady-state consumption level of that country, with the other country’s
consumption being crowded out; (ii), as in the small country case, neces-
sarily worsens (resp. improves) the steady-state external asset position if
the country’s preference displays adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity,
irrespective of the other country’s preferences; and (iii) has long-run and
short-run spill-over eﬀects on the other country’s consumption, depending
crucially on whether the policy implementing country displays adjacent or
distant complementarity.
Our two-country model helps to explain two puzzling facts that Gruber
(2004) reports by using a small-country model. First, his GMM estimates
of the habit preference parameter for two large countries, United States and
Japan, are smaller than those for smaller countries, e.g. Italy, Spain, and
Netherlands. Second, in the case of the two large countries, his habit model
overpredicts the actual volatility of the current account, unlike for in the
smaller country case. To explain these, say, "large-country puzzles", we
2For the eﬀect of habit formation on wealth distribution, see Díaz et al. (2003). They
show that habit formation decreases wealth inequality by raising wealth-poor consumers’s
precautionary savings more than wealth-rich ones’.
3show that, under adjacent complementarity, interest rate adjustments enlarge
the consumption eﬀect of an income shock and thereby mitigate its current
account eﬀect. As an important empirical implication, the habit parameter of
a large country would be underestimated, and the current account volatility
overestimated, if they were estimated, as in Gruber (2004), using a small-
country model.
With non-negligible initial net foreign assets, an increase in ﬁscal spend-
ing induces additional income eﬀects by changing the world interest rate.
Even though ﬁscal spending is assumed to generate no direct utility, it is
shown, as an important welfare implication, that due to the intertemporal
terms-of-trade eﬀect, an increase in ﬁscal spending ﬁnanced by lump-sum
taxation can beneﬁt the policy implementing country and harm the neigh-
boring country. This is an intertemporal version of (reversed) “immiseriz-
ing growth” discussed by, e.g., Bhagwati (1958) and Brecher and Bhagwati
(1982).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we
present a two-country model. In Section 3, we examine equilibrium dynamics
of consumption, the interest rate, and net foreign assets. Section 4 analyzes
the eﬀects of an increase in one country’s ﬁscal spending. In Section 5, welfare
enhancing government spending is discussed. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider a two-country world economy composed of home and foreign coun-
tries. Each country is populated with inﬁnitely lived identical agents. The
representative agents in home and foreign countries are referred to as con-
sumers H and F, respectively. They consume a single consumption good and
hold wealth in the form of bonds. Both goods and bonds are assumed to
be costlessly traded in international markets. For brevity, the representative
agents H and F are assumed to be endowed with constant amounts of output
y and y∗, respectively. Throughout the paper, the foreign country’s variables
are represented with superscript asterisks.
Consumption forms habits. Letting z
(∗)
t represent the time-t habit, we
specify z
(∗)
t as the average of the past consumption rates c
(∗)



















4where ˙ x represents the time derivative of variable x and α represents the
discount rate for past consumption rates. We assume that consumers in both
countries have the common discount rate α for past consumption rates. This
enables us to obtain the tractable dynamics of a two-country equilibrium.
Consumers H and F have diﬀerent preferences over consumption and





where θ represents the subjective discount rate, which is assumed constant.
Following Ryder and Heal (1973), function u is assumed to satisfy the follow-
ing regularity conditions: (C1) uc > 0; (C2) uz 5 0; (C3) uc (c,c)+uz (c,c) >
0; (C4) u is concave in (c,z);(C5) limc→0 uc (c,z)=∞ uniformly in z; and
(C6) limc→0 [uc (c,c)+uz (c,c)] = ∞. Consumer F’s utility U∗
0 is speciﬁed in
t h es a m ew a y .
Due to habit formation, consumer preferences are intertemporally depen-
dent. Within the representative agent framework, Ryder and Heal (1973)
characterize the resulting intertemporal complementarity in consumption by
adjacent and distant complementarities: With adjacent complementarity, an
increase in today’s habits increases the marginal utility of today’s consump-
tion more than it increases marginal disutility of habits, thereby enlarging
today’s optimal consumption. Under distant complementarity, an increase
in today’s habits increases marginal disutility of habits so much that it re-
duces today’s consumption rate. We apply this idea to characterize each
country’s preferences: Consumer H’s preference is said to display adjacent
(distant) complementarity when ucz (c,c)+ α
θ+2αuzz(c,c) > (<)0. Similarly,
adjacent and distant complementarities in country F are deﬁn e di nt e r m s
of u∗. In the case of the representative agent economy, intertemporal com-
plementarities displayed by consumers’ preferences deﬁnitely determine the
equilibrium dynamics (see, e.g., Ryder and Heal 1973 and Ikeda and Gombi
1999). In contrast, when the economy consists of heterogeneous agents, as in
the present case, pecuniary externalities through markets divert each agent’s
consumption saving behavior from what is predicted from each agent’s own
preference, as shown in the following section.
To ensure the steady state, let us assume that
θ = θ
∗.
5Unlike in the single agent model, the interest rate r can deviate from this
subjective discount rate.
Let bt denote net foreign assets held by consumer H. The ﬂow budget
c o n s t r a i n tf o rc o n s u m e rHi sg i v e nb y
˙ bt = rtbt + y − ct − τ, (3)
where τ represents a lump-sum tax levied by the government in country H.
Given the initial values (b0,z 0), consumer H chooses C0 = {ct,b t,z t}∞
t=0 so
as to maximize (2) subject to: (i) the ﬂow budget constraint (3); (ii) the
formation of consumption habits (1); and (iii) the transversality conditions.
Letting λt (= 0) be the shadow price of savings and ξt(5 0) that of habit
formation, the optimal conditions are given by
uc (c,z)=λt − αξt, (4)
˙ λt =( θ − rt)λt, (5)
˙ ξt =( θ + α)ξt − uz (ct,z t), (6)
together with (1), (3), and the transversality conditions for bt and zt. Con-
sumer F’s behavior can be speciﬁed in exactly the same way.
The governments in the two countries follow the balanced budget princi-
ple. Their ﬁscal spendings g and g∗ equal tax revenues from lump-sum taxes
τ and τ∗, respectively. By substituting this into (3) we obtain the balance of
payment equation,
˙ bt = rtbt + y − ct − g. (7)
The model is closed by introducing the market clearing conditions:
ct + c
∗
t = Y (≡ y + y




t =0 , (9)
where Y represents the disposable aggregate income. By Walras’ law, these
are not independent: (9) together with (7) and the corresponding constraint








t) is determined by equations (1), (4) through
(7), the corresponding equations for F, and the market equilibrium condition
(8) or (9).
63 Two-Country Equilibrium
3.1 The world felicity function
In this economy consumption dynamics in the two countries interact through
international market transactions. To ease the analysis, it is useful to deﬁne
aggregate habit capital Zt as
Zt ≡ zt + z
∗
t. (10)
Since α is assumed to be internationally identical, the dynamics of Zt can be
expressed from (1) and the market clearing condition (8) as
˙ Zt = α(Y − Zt). (11)
Note that this is an autonomous dynamic equation. If Zt and zt are given,
z∗
t are determined from (10) as
z
∗
t = Zt − zt. (12)
By using (12), dynamics can be drastically simpliﬁed in the following









t from (5) (and the corre-




∗ (Y − c,Z − z), (13)
ς ≡ ξ − σξ
∗, (14)
where (8) and (12) are substituted.
The new felicity function v represents an aggregate utility function with
weights being given by relative individual marginal utilities. We could call it
the world felicity function. The new shadow price ς is the weighted diﬀerence
in the shadow prices of habits. From the deﬁnition of v, ς could be regarded
as net marginal gains of transferring consumption capital from consumer F
to H. With these deﬁnitions, we can reduce the equilibrium dynamics of
consumption habits around a steady-state point as follows:
7Proposition 1: In equilibrium, consumer H’s habits around a steady-state







































where ˆ x denotes a deviation of variable x from its steady-state value ¯ x: ˆ x ≡
xt − ¯ x.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1: The dynamic equation (15) is block recursive, where coeﬃcient




is exactly the same as in the
case of the small-country model (e.g., Ikeda and Gombi 1999 and Mansoorian
1993a, b), except that v and ς represent the world average preferences, instead
of individual countries’ preferences.
Remark 2: As easily seen, Proposition 1 is an application of the second
theorem of welfare economics. Without any distortion, the Pareto optimal
resource allocation attained as a complete market equilibrium can be dupli-
cated as a solution to a social welfare maximization problem:
max U0 + βU
∗
0,
subject to Y = ct + c
∗
t,Z t = zt + z
∗
t, ˙ zt = α(ct − zt),
and ˙ Zt = α(Y − Zt).
Indeed, the corresponding Hamiltonian function,
Ht = u(ct,z t)+βu
∗(Y − ct,Z t − zt)+ςtα(ct − zt)+ιtα(Y − Zt),
produces the same optimal condition as in Proposition 1 when weight β is
set equal to σ.
Since the dynamic equation (11) of aggregate habit Z is autonomous, it is
noteworthy that, if the economy is initially in steady-state equilibrium, and
8if the steady-state value of Z, which equals Y from (11), does not change, the
aggregate habit stays at value Y . In other words, in the absence of aggregate
income shocks, the aggregate habit dynamics degenerate at ¯ Z(= Y ),s ot h a t




dynamics, as in the small-country case. Note, however, that the transition
matrix here is deﬁned in terms of the world felicity function.
3.2 Equilibrium dynamics
3.2.1 Habit and consumption





2 − 4α(θ +2 α)Ω
2
(< 0) and − α, (16)
and one unstable root, which is conjugate with ω,w h e r eω is a character-





/vcc. In parallel with intertem-
poral complementarities with respect to the individual consumers’ prefer-
ences, Ω captures equilibrium intertemporal complementarities: we refer to
the world felicity function as displaying adjacent (distant) complementarity
when vcz (c,c)+ α
θ+2αvzz(c,c) > (<)0,i . e . ,Ω > (resp. <)0.
Let us introduce complementarity indices ΩH and ΩF for the individual
























where, e.g., a positive ΩH represents adjacent (distant) complementarity for
H. The indices, ΩH and ΩF, capture the strength of habit formation of the
individual consumers H and F. When ΩH is larger than ΩF, for example,
complementarity between consumption and habit is stronger for consumer H
t h a nf o rc o n s u m e rF .
Deﬁnition: Consumer H is more (less) in the habit of consuming than
consumer F when ΩH > (<)ΩF.
From the deﬁnition (13) of v, intertemporal complementarities with re-
spect to the individual countries’ preferences can be related to those prevail-
ing in equilibrium by:
Ω = εΩ







Therefore, adjacent (distant) complementarity in both countries implies ad-
jacent (distant) complementarity in the two-country equilibrium. When the
individual countries’ preferences display diﬀerent intertemporal complemen-
tarities, equilibrium intertemporal complementarity is determined by the rel-
ative strength of intertemporal complementarities regarding the individual
preferences.
As shown in Appendix B.1, the saddle plane governed by the two stable
roots are expressed as
˙ z = ωˆ z − (ω + α)(1 − δ) ˆ Z, (18)










ˆ z − (1 − δ) ˆ Z
´
. (20)
Diﬀerentiate this by t and substitute (1), (19), and (20) successively into
the result. Then, by taking (8) into account, we obtain the motion of each
country’s consumption as
˙ c = ωˆ c, (21)
˙ c
∗ = ωˆ c
∗. (22)
Irrespective of the second-order habit dynamics of (18) and (19), therefore,
the equilibrium consumption dynamics are of the ﬁrst order. Equations (1)
and (21) jointly govern the equilibrium dynamics of (c,z); and equations (1)
and (22) do dynamics of (c∗,z∗). The resulting phase diagrams are illustrated
in the (c,z) and (c∗,z∗) planes of Figure 1.
To understand the consumption-habit dynamics given by (20), consider
ﬁrst the case without any aggregate income shocks, ˆ Z =0 , in which case the
















10From equations (16) through (23), when the world felicity function displays
adjacent complementarity (Ω > 0), ω + α is positive and thus the stable
arms (23) are positively sloping, whereas under distant complementarity with
respect to v (Ω < 0) the trajectories have a negative slope with negative
ω+α. That is, in equilibrium, both countries experience positive or negative




t > (<)0, as
the world felicity function displays adjacent or distant complementarity. This
property is the same as in the small-country case except that intertemporal
complementarities here are deﬁn e di nt e r m so ft h ew o r l df e l i c i t yf u n c t i o n ,
instead of each country’s felicity function.
When aggregate habit capital ˆ Z varies, the equilibrium consumption dy-
namics depend on ˆ Z. The second term of (20) captures the eﬀect of an
increase in ˆ Z for given ˆ zt. Alternatively, we substitute the deﬁnition of δ,











Since (ω + α)/Ω is positive irrespective of whether the world felicity function
displays adjacent or distant complementarity,3 this reveals that the sign of ˆ c
is determined by the relative magnitudes of εΩHˆ z and (1 − ε)ΩFˆ z∗. ˆ c can
thus be negative even when εΩHˆ z is positive if (1 − ε)ΩFˆ z∗ is large enough.
Suppose that both the countries’ preferences display adjacent complemen-
tarity, ΩH,ΩF > 0.I fˆ z and ˆ z∗ are positive, each country’s consumer plans
to consume a larger quantity than the steady-state level. Since a positive
ˆ c∗ implies a negative ˆ c in equilibrium, the sign of equilibrium ˆ c should be
negative when (1 − ε)ΩFˆ z∗ is larger than εΩHˆ z. As will be shown later, the
market will be cleared by a rise in the interest rate.
It is important to note that even if one country has no preference for
habits, the time series of consumption rates will display seemingly habit-
persistent patterns. For example, suppose that country H has no preference
for habits: uz =0 ,u zz =0 ,u cz =0 , and hence ΩH =0 .F r o m ( 2 0 ) , t h e
equilibrium consumption of country H still depends on its own habit capital,
with root ω being determined solely by country F’s preferences for habits (see
(16) and (17)). Given that c is related to c∗ by market equilibrium condition
(8), and that z is related to z∗ and Z by (10), the dependence of c∗ on z∗
3When Ω =0 ,w eh a v eω+α =0 . It can be shown from (16) that lim
Ω→0
(ω+α)/ Ω = α.
11due to country F’s habit preferences induces the dependence of c on (z,Z)
even though c does not depend directly on z.
3.2.2 The interest rate
As is proven by Appendix B.2, the interest rate dynamics are given by

















where κ and η are deﬁned as
κ ≡
ωuccu∗
cc (θ +2 α)
λ









Equation (25) reveals that the equilibrium interest rate is driven by coun-
try H’s habit capital ˆ z and the aggregate habit capital ˆ Z.S i n c eˆ z − ˆ z∗ =
2ˆ z − ˆ Z, a change in ˆ z with a given ˆ Z can be taken as a change in diﬀerence
between ˆ z and ˆ z∗. Equation (25) thus implies that the dynamics of ˆ r rely on
the diﬀerence between, and the sum of, ˆ z and ˆ z∗. Given that the dynamics
of z and Z are jointly generated by (18) and (19), it is easy to show that the
resulting dynamics of the interest rate can be non-monotonic. As seen from
(25), ˆ r also depends on the diﬀerence in ΩH and ΩF as well as on the average
Ω of the two.
It is too complicated to analyze ˆ r by using (25) directly. Instead, we
focus on two special cases: that (i) the aggregate habit stock stays constant
at the initial steady-state value, i.e., ˆ Zt =0for all t; and that (ii) the two
countries’ preferences exhibit identical degrees of adjacent complementarity,
i.e., ΩH = ΩF = Ω.4
Case (i): ˆ Zt =0for all t. In this case, equation (25) reduces to:






4This case takes place (i) when the values of Ωi (i = H,F)h a p p e nt ob et h es a m e
in steady state; (ii) when the felicity functions take quadratic forms with constant and
internationally identical second-order derivatives; or (iii) when the two countries are per-
fectly identical with respect to preferences, endowments, and the initial stocks of habit
capitals and net foreign assets. In case (iii), although the Ωi values are globally identical,
we cannot examine the case of non-zero b0.
12implying that ˆ r positively (negatively) comoves with ˆ z as consumer H is
more or less in the habit of consuming than consumer F, i.e., ΩH − ΩF is
positive or negative.5 To understand this, suppose that both consumers H
and F display adjacent complementarity (ΩH > 0, ΩF > 0); that ΩH > ΩF;
and that z (t) > ¯ z, and hence, from (12), z∗ (t) < ¯ z∗.T h e n ,i fr equaled θ,
consumer H would consume more now than in the future steady state, thereby
producing excess demand in the “present good” market, irrespective of that
consumer F would consume less now than in the future (note: ΩH > ΩF).
T h em a r k e tc l e a r i n gr should thus be higher than its steady-state level θ.
As shown later, the dynamics of ˆ z are monotonically driven by stable root
ω when ˆ Zt =0 . From (26), therefore, the interest rate in this case displays
monotonic dynamics,
˙ r = ωˆ r.
Case (ii): ΩH = ΩF = Ω. When the two countries’ preferences exhibit the
identical degrees of adjacent complementarity, the equilibrium interest rate
is determined from (25) as
ˆ r = ηΩˆ Z, (27)
implying that ˆ Z and Ω play crucial roles in this case. Suppose that Z (t) > ¯ Z.
Then, if consumers exhibit adjacent (distant) complementarity, i.e., Ω > 0
(Ω < 0), ceteris paribus there prevails excess demand (supply) in the present
good market. This renders r higher (lower) than its steady-state value θ.T h e
equilibrium interest rate positively (negatively) comoves with the aggregate
habit stock, which exhibits monotonic motions with stable root −α (see (19)).
The resulting dynamics of r are given explicitly by
˙ r = −αˆ r. (28)
3.2.3 Net foreign assets
The transition dynamics of net foreign assets also depend on the property of
the world felicity function and international heterogeneity in habit formation.
5If country H is identical to country F (ΩH = ΩF), or if one of the two countries is
small in the sense that λ or λ
∗ is inﬁnitely large (λ or λ
∗ →∞ ), for which case κ is zero,
the interest rate dynamics degenerate at θ as in the small-country case (e.g., Ikeda and
Gombi 1999).
13As shown by Appendix B.3, by linearizing (7) and substituting (24) and (25)








































Two habit stocks ˆ zt and ˆ Zt aﬀect ˆ bt by changing consumption and the
interest rate. Changes in the habit stocks aﬀect consumption through (20)
and thereby inﬂuence the accumulation of net foreign assets. This eﬀect
is expressed by the terms without b0 in (29), which depend on ω + α, i.e.,
whether the world felicity function displays distant or adjacent complemen-
tarity. The habit stocks also aﬀect the interest rate by (25). The resulting
change in interest income alters the time proﬁle of net foreign assets. The
eﬀect is captured by the terms associated with b0 in (29). These income re-
transfer eﬀects through interest rate changes may well have various adverse
eﬀects. To avoid analytical complexity, we get rid of the eﬀects by assuming
that the initial amounts b0 of net foreign assets for both countries are negli-
gible, as in Devereux and Shi (1991). The implications of a nonzero b0 will
be discussed brieﬂyi nS e c t i o n5a n di nA p p e n d i xC .
Assumption 1: b∗
0 ≈ 0.





ˆ zt − (1 − δ) ˆ Zt
´
.






14Since from (21) the dynamics of ˆ c(t) are monotonic, those of ˆ b(t) are also
monotonic. Figure 1 depicts the saddle arm in the (b,c) plane as upward
sloping schedule DD0.
3.3 Steady state
From (1), (5), (7), and (29), the steady-state equilibrium, (¯ c,¯ c∗, ¯ z,¯ z∗, ¯ Z,¯ b,¯ b∗, ¯ r),
is determined by:
¯ c =¯ z,¯ c
∗ =¯ z
∗, (31)
¯ c +¯ c
∗ = Y = ¯ Z, (32)
¯ r = θ, (33)




(¯ z − z0)+
(ω + α)(1− ε)ΩF
α(θ − ω)Ω
¡ ¯ Z − Z0
¢
, (35)
¯ b = −¯ b
∗. (36)
together with (8), (9) and (12), where (35) comes from (29) evaluated at
t =0 .
By substituting (31) and (33) into (34), we obtain
θ¯ b + y =¯ z + g. (37)




(¯ z − z0)+
(ω + α)(1− ε)ΩF
α(θ − ω)Ω
(Y − Z0). (38)
Equations (37) and (38) jointly determine
¡¯ b, ¯ z
¢
. Figure 2 depicts the deter-
mination of
¡¯ b, ¯ z
¢
:s c h e d u l eBB0 depicted with a positive slope represents
(37), whereas schedule SS0, which represents (38), can be either positively
or negatively sloping as the world felicity function displays either adjacent
or distant complementarity. Even when schedule SS0 is positively sloping,
schedule BB0 is always steeper than SS0. The steady-state equilibrium point ¡¯ b, ¯ z
¢
is given by the intersection point E of the two schedules. Given this, ¡
¯ c,¯ c∗, ¯ z∗, ¯ Z
¢
is determined by (31) and (32); and ¯ b∗ by (36).
From linearity of (37) and (38), we can examine the determinants of the
long-run external asset distribution by solving the two equations for ¯ b as


































0 , adjusted by the relative strengths of adjacent
complementarities εΩH and (1 − ε)ΩF. For short, we call I and I∗ surplus
incomes.
Deﬁnition: I and I∗are referred to as surplus incomes.
Since (ω + α)/Ω is positive, (39) implies that ¯ b is positively proportionate
to the international diﬀerence I − I∗ in surplus income. This implies the
following proposition:
Proposition 2: With Assumption 1, a country is a creditor (resp. debtor)
in steady state when its surplus income is larger (resp. smaller) than the
other country’s: ¯ b T 0 ⇔ I T I∗.
To understand this result, suppose that a country’s net output exceeds the
habitual consumption level. Then, if country H’s preferences are of adjacent
(resp. distant) complementarity, ceteris paribus it saves (resp. consumes) the
excessive income and thereby holds positive (resp. negative) external assets
in the long run. The same is true for the other country. In equilibrium,
the country with a larger (resp. smaller) surplus income accumulates (resp.
decumulates) external assets.
From Proposition 2, long-run indebtedness depends on three determi-
nants: (i) net output; (ii) the strength of habit formation; (iii) the initial
habit stock. Net output is also emphasized as a key determinant by Frenkel
and Razin (1996) and Devereux and Shi (1991). Unlike in our model, in
the Frenkel and Razin model with intertemporally separable preferences, net
output aﬀects net foreign assets only when time preference diﬀers internation-
ally; and in the Devereux and Shi model of endogenous discounting, larger
net output implies smaller net foreign assets.
16Proposition 2 implies the three parts of Corollary 1 below. First, from

























implying that an increase in a country’s ﬁscal spending reduces (resp. en-
larges) its long-run external assets and hence enlarges (resp. reduces) the
other country’s when consumer preferences in the policy implementing coun-
try display adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity. For example, an in-
crease in g reduces or enlarges ¯ b as ΩH is positive or negative. Irrespective
of the two-country setting, note that this property is the same as in the
small-country case.
Second, a permanent income transfer from country H to country F, −dy =
dy∗ > 0,a ﬀects each country’s external asset position as
d¯ b
dy











It follows that the income transfer reduces or enlarges country H’s net foreign
assets as the world felicity function exhibits adjacent or distant complemen-
tarity.
Third, the initial stock z0 of habit capital has qualitatively the same
implication for the external asset position ¯ b as ﬁscal spending g. These
discussions can be summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: With Assumption 1,
( i )a ni n c r e a s ei nac o u n t r y ’ sﬁscal spending reduces (resp. enlarges) its long-
run external assets and hence enlarges (resp. reduces) the other country’s
when consumer preferences in the policy implementing country display adja-
cent (resp. distant) complementarity: d¯ b/dg = −d¯ b∗/dg S 0 ⇔ ΩH T 0;
(ii) a permanent income transfer from country H to country F reduces (resp.
enlarges) H’s net foreign assets when the world felicity function exhibits adja-
cent (resp. distant) complementarity: d¯ b/dy
¯ ¯
dy=−dy∗ = − d¯ b∗/dy
¯ ¯
dy=−dy∗ T
0 ⇔ Ω T 0;a n d
17(iii) the initial stocks of habit capitals have qualitatively the same implication
for external asset positions as ﬁscal spending.
Remark 3: The existing literature (e.g. Devereux and Shi (1991), Frenkel
and Razin (1996), and Ikeda and Ono (1992)) shows that a country will tend
to be a long-run creditor the more patient it is and/or the greater is its net
output. Our results can be related to their discussion as follows. Starting
from the initial situation that net output equals the habitual consumption
standard in each country, consider a marginal increase in country H’s net out-
put, making its net output greater than the habitual consumption standard.
As conjectured from the small-country analysis (and as will be indeed shown
later), when country H’s preferences are more of adjacent complementarity
than country F’s, then, in response to t h ep o s i t i v ei n c o m es h o c k ,c o u n t r yH
is more reluctant to increase consumption in the short run and hence more
likely to be a creditor in the long run. In this case, country H can be regarded
a sm o r ep a t i e n tt h a nFi nt h es h o r tr u na n d ,a si nt h el i t e r a t u r e ,t h em o r ep a -
tient country becomes a long-run creditor. The point is that which country is
more patient depends on the relative strengths of adjacent complementarity
and on how much greater net output than the habitual consumption stan-
dard they have. To see this, consider, instead, a marginal decrease in country
H’s net output, in which case the new level of net output is lower than the
habitual consumption standard. When country H’s preferences are more of
adjacent complementarity than country F’s, country H is more reluctant to
decrease consumption in response to the negative income shock and becomes
a debtor in the long run. It is true that the less patient country is a long-run
debtor. But it is country H, in this case, that is the less patient.
3.4 Welfare
From the linearized equilibrium dynamics obtained above, Appendix B.4





(ω + α)uc + αuz
α(θ − ω)
(z0 − ¯ z)
−
(ω + α)(1− ε)ΩF
α(θ + α)(θ − ω)Ω






















z](Z0 − Y ), (44)
respectively.
4E ﬀects of government spending
L e tu sn e x tc o n s i d e ra ni n c r e a s ei nﬁscal spending g in country H, ﬁnanced
by lump-sum taxes.6
4.1 Consumption and net foreign assets
As shown by Corollary 1(i), an increase in g reduces or increases ¯ b as the
policy-implementing country H exhibits adjacent or distant complementarity,
as in the small-country case. From (8), (37) and (38), the eﬀects on steady-


























T 0 ⇔ Ω
H T 0. (46)
From (45), an increase in g decreases ¯ c whenever ΩH is positive. Figure
2 illustrates the typical case that ΩH > 0;ΩF > 0; and Ω > 0,f o rw h i c hc a s e
the slope of the SS0 schedule is positive but gentler than that of BB0.A n
6We could consider three types of shocks: a shock that aﬀects both of the BB0 and SS0
schedules in Figure 2 (e.g., an increase in ﬁscal spending in country H); one that shifts the
BB0 schedule, leaving the SS0 schedule unchanged (e.g., an income transfer between the
two counties, −dy = dy∗); and one that shifts the SS0 schedule, leaving BB0 unchanged
(e.g., productivity shocks dy∗ in country F). For the eﬀects of income transfers, see Gombi
and Ikeda (2003). The eﬀects of productivity shocks dy∗ in country F can be obtained
from the eﬀects of ﬁscal spending in country H by replacing country H’s variables with
country F’s.
19increase in g shifts schedule BB0 to the left whereas SS0 to the right, thereby
reducing ¯ b and ¯ z (and hence ¯ c).7
From (46), the spill-over eﬀect on country F’s consumption ¯ c∗ depends
crucially on whether country H’s preferences display adjacent or distant com-
plementarity, ΩH T 0. This is because the eﬀects on ¯ b and hence on ¯ b∗ rely
crucially on the sign of ΩH (see (40)). When country H’s preferences exhibit
adjacent complementarity (ΩH > 0), an increase in g decreases ¯ b,i n c r e a s e s
¯ b∗ and hence increases ¯ c∗,a n dv i c ev e r s a .












This implies that, as in the small-country case, c(0) plumps less (resp. more)
than its net output as the preferences exhibit adjacent (resp. distant) com-
plementarity: dc(0)/dg ≷ −1 ⇔ ΩH ≷ 0.8
Given this, in turn, market-clearing condition (8) implies that c∗ (0) de-
creases or increases as ΩH is positive or negative. Formally, from (47) and










S 0 ⇔ Ω
H T 0. (48)
Therefore, when H’s preferences display adjacent (resp. distant) complemen-
tarity, country F’s consumption jumps down (or up) on impact. Comparing












7When ΩH is negative, however, ¯ c can increase due to an increase in interest income
θ¯ b in excess of the lump-sum tax increase if Ω = 0 and hence ΩF > 0. Formally, from (17)






ΩF 5 ΩH <
ω(1 − ε)(θ + α)
αε(θ − ω)
ΩF.
From this relation, it can be seen that necessary conditions for d¯ c/dg to be positive are:
ΩH < 0, ΩF > 0, and Ω = 0 by noting that
ω(1−ε)(θ+α)
αε(θ−ω) T −1−ε
ε ⇔ Ω T 0.
8We cannot exclude the pathological case that equilibrium consumption c(0) increases
on impact when consumer H’s preferences display strong adjacent complementarity.
20i m p l y i n gt h a tt h ei m p a c te ﬀect of an increase in g on c∗ is necessarily opposite
in signs to its steady-state eﬀect. This is because, without direct income
shocks in country F, any increases or decreases in ¯ c∗ should be ﬁnanced by
increases or decreases in ¯ b∗, which are only brought about by decreases or
increases in c∗ (0) to cause current account surplus or deﬁcits in transition.
When consumer H’s preferences are of adjacent complementarity, ΩH >
0, the transition dynamics are illustrated in Figure 3 by using the phase
diagrams introduced in Figure 1. From (40), an increase in g reduces ¯ b and
hence ¯ c (see (45)). Although c(0) may decrease or increase (see (47)), savings
necessarily reduce to generate the current account deﬁcits, as in the small-
country case. The ﬁgure depicts the normal case that c(0) decreases, so that
saddle arm DD0 in the (b,c) plane shifts downward. Net foreign assets b
gradually decumulate from b0 to ¯ b along the new saddle arm, D1D0
1. Since
¯ b∗(= −¯ b) increases, ¯ c∗ increases (see (46)). To realize this, c∗ (0) necessarily
drops to induce the current account surplus (see (48)). As c∗ monotonically
increases toward ¯ c∗, z∗ sooner or later stops decreasing and starts rising
toward ¯ z∗(= ¯ c∗).
4.2 The interest rate
The eﬀect on the interest rate can be computed by diﬀerentiating (25) with
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Instead of discussing the general properties of this complex result, we restrict
our attention to the special case (ii) discussed in Section 3.2.2.
Consider case (ii), in which consumer preferences exhibit identical degrees
of adjacent complementarity: ΩH = ΩF = Ω. Equation (49) then reduces to
dr(0)
dg
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
= ηΩ T 0 ⇔ Ω T 0. (50)
This implies that an increase in g raises (or lowers) r(0) as the world felicity
function displays adjacent (or distant) complementarity. Such a policy aﬀects
the commodity market on both the supply and demand sides: it reduces the
supply of the good that should be consumed; and it decreases disposable
21income in country H. In the case of adjacent complementarity, the decrease
in disposable income would lower c(0), but not so much as it would lower
¯ c if r(0) is constant at θ. This means that there would be excess demand
in the time-zero good market. To clear the market, r(0) rises above θ,
which, in turn, decreases aggregate consumption to the lowered aggregate
supply level. Alternatively, when the world felicity function exhibits distant
complementarity, an increase in g produces excess supply in the present good
market, thereby lowering the interest rate. After the initial response, the
interest rate then monotonically converges toward θ as seen from (28).
4.3 Welfare
Irrespective of how each country’s consumption responds over time, an in-
crease in government spending g necessarily reduces country H’s welfare. To
see this, we substitute (8) into (43) and (44), diﬀerentiate the results by g,











T h ei n c r e a s ei ng harms country H’s welfare by the amount equal to the
present value of the marginal utility. The marginal change in g,h o w e v e r ,d o e s
not aﬀect country F’s welfare in this non-distortionary competitive equilib-
rium.9 However, these properties are limited to the case of b0 =0 ,a ss h o w n
later in Section 5.
4.4 Empirical implications
By using a small-country model, Gruber (2004) shows that incorporating
habit formation improves the explanatory power of the intertemporal current
account model in advanced countries. However, we can ﬁnd two puzzling
diﬀerences between his result for two large countries, the United States and
Japan, and that for smaller countries, such as Italy, Spain, and Netherlands.
First, the GMM estimates of the habit preference parameter for the two
countries are smaller than those for the smaller countries. Second, in the case
o ft h et w ol a r g ec o u n t r i e s ,t h eh a b i tm o d e lo v e r p r e d i c t st h ea c t u a lv o l a t i l i t y
9The same result can be obtained from Bianconi and Turnovsky (1997, p.80) by assum-
ing that g does not generate direct utility and that there is no initial external indebtedness.
22of the current account, unlike in the smaller country case. We shall show
that these "large-country puzzles" could be attributed to biases that will
arise when, with the small country assumption, the interest-rate adjustment
is ignored.
To consider the large-country puzzles in this deterministic framework,
we examine impacts of an income shock on consumption and on the current
account, instead of directly treating their volatilities. Consider an increase in
g, a negative income shock, in two diﬀerent economies: (i) the two-country
world economy with the internationally same strength of habit formation,
ΩH = ΩF = Ω > 0 and (ii) the small open economy (SOE) with the same Ω.










whereas in the two-country economy, from (47), we obtain
dc(0)
dg






implying that the consumption impact is larger in the two-country world
economy than it would be in the SOE:
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dc(0)
dg
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
SOE
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ <
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dc(0)
dg
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯. (53)
This comes from the fact that in the two-country case an interest-rate hike
induced by the increase in g (see (50)) enlarges the decrease of c(0).E m -
pirically, inequality (53) implies that consumption is more volatile in large
countries than it would be in small countries if the habit parameter value is
the same.
From the viewpoint of estimating the habit parameter value, captured
by ω, from a given observed volatility of consumption, in turn, inequality
(53) implies that the ω estimate is larger when it is estimated by using the
large country model than by using the SOE model: Explicitly, from the
comparison of (51) and (52), the ω value required to explain a given value of
the consumption change is larger in (52) than in (51) since ² ∈ (0,1).T h e
10See Ikeda and Gombi (1999).
23h a b i tp a r a m e t e rv a l u eo fal a r g ec o u n t r yw o u l dt h u sb eu n d e r e s t i m a t e di f
it is estimated using a small country model. This consistently explains the
puzzle that the estimates of the habit parameters for the United States and
Japan are smaller than the smaller countries.11
As for the current account eﬀect of an increase in g, inequality (53) implies
t h a tt h ed i r e c tn e g a t i v ee ﬀect of the g-increase on the current account is oﬀset
by a larger decrease in consumption in the two-country setting than in the
SOE setting. Formally, we can derive
d˙ b(0)
dg






whereas in the two-country case, from (7) and (47), we have
d˙ b(0)
dg






implying ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
d˙ b(0)
dg
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
SOE
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
>
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
d˙ b(0)
dg
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
.
As a result, the current account volatility of a large country would be over-
estimated under the small country assumption since the interest-rate eﬀect
is ignored in the setting. This consistently explains Gruber’s overprediction
of the current account volatility for Japan and the United States.12
These empirical implications are summarized as follows:
Proposition 3: T h eh a b i tp a r a m e t e ro fal a r g ec o u n t r yw o u l db eu n d e r e s t i -
mated, and the current account volatility overestimated, if they were estimated
using a small-country model.
The point is that, in a large country, the interest rate adjustment exag-
gerates consumption impact of an income shock, so that neglecting this eﬀect
11Gruber (2004) assumes linear habit formation in specifying felicity function, as we
shall deﬁne as u(c,z)=
(c−γz)
1−ϕ
1−ϕ below in subsection 5.2, and thereby estimates γ as the
habit parameter. It is easy to conﬁrm that ω is positively related with γ.
12Gruber (2004) gives the conjecture that the overpredictions of the current account
volatility for United States and Japan could be attributed to the small-country assumption.
Our discussion provides a formal proof for it.
24under the small country assumption brings upward bias to the impacts on
saving and on the current account for the large country and brings downward
bias to the estimated habit parameter of the large country.
5 Welfare-enhancing ﬁscal spending: An im-
plication of b0 6=0
5.1 Reversed immiserizing growth eﬀects
We have so far assumed that b0 equals zero by Assumption 1. When b0 6=0 ,
however, an increase in government spending g has additional welfare eﬀects
by causing income re-transfers through interest rate changes, i.e., changes
in the intertemporal terms of trade. Even though government spending is
assumed to provide no direct utility, we shall show that an increase in g can
enhance country H’s welfare level due to favorable changes in the intertem-
poral terms of trade, i.e., rises (resp. falls) in the world interest rate if the
country is a creditor (resp. debtor).
Let us now abandon Assumption 1 to allow b0 to take a non-zero value.
For expository purposes, we focus on case (ii), ΩH = ΩF = Ω.A ss h o w ni n
Appendix C, an increase in g aﬀects country H’s welfare by
dU
dg












implying that the increase in g improves country H’s welfare if θ
α+θηΩb0 > 1.
With a positive b0, the policy is welfare enhancing if Ω is a suﬃciently large
positive number, i.e., if consumers’ preferences are of suﬃciently strong ad-
jacent complementarity. Note that the term θ
α+θηΩb0 represents an income
re-distribution eﬀect due to interest rate changes since, as derived in Appen-
dix C, the eﬀect on the interest rate is given by
dr(0)
dg
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
T 0 ⇔ Ω T 0.
With adjacent complementarity (Ω > 0), ceteris paribus an increase in g
causes excess demand for the present good, raises the interest rate, and en-
larges the net output and the welfare level if b0 is positive and large. This is
25an intertemporal version of (reversed) immiserizing growth discussed by the
trade theory: a creditor country, i.e., an exporter of the present good, can be
better oﬀ due to intertemporal terms-of-trade improvements by decreasing
the supply of the present good.
These changes in the intertemporal terms of trade have spill-over eﬀects
on country F. Appendix C derives
dU∗
dg







which reveals that the increase in g makes country F worse (resp. better) oﬀ
when Ωb0 > 0 (resp. Ωb0 < 0). With a positive b0(= −b∗
0), for example, an
increase in g induces a deterioration (resp. an improvement) in country F’s
intertemporal terms of trade, thereby harming (resp. beneﬁting) country F.
These results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 4: Suppose that country H is as much in the habit of consuming
as country F: ΩH = ΩF = Ω. Then, due to intertemporal terms-of-trade
eﬀects, an increase in ﬁscal spending g in country H
(i) enhances the country’s own welfare if and only if θ
α+θηΩb0 > 1;a n d
(ii) harms country F if and only if Ωb0 > 0.
Remark 4: By using a two-country model, Bianconi (2003) shows the pos-
sibility that an increase in ﬁscal spending has a reversed immiserizing growth
eﬀect due to changes in the intratemporal terms of trade. He shows that an
increase in a country’s ﬁscal spending ﬁnanced by capital taxation contracts
the production frontier in the country, and thereby appreciates the real ex-
change rate, which can improve the asset position and the welfare level of
the country. However, as pointed out in Bianconi (2003, p.26) this reversed
immiserizing growth eﬀect cannot take place when government spending is
ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax, and/or when there is only one consumption
good. Proposition 4 shows that with habit formation, ﬁscal spending can
make the policy implementing country better oﬀ by improving the intertem-
poral terms of trade even when the policy is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation
in a single good economy.
5.2 Example
To clarify the possibilities of the reversed immiserizing growth eﬀect caused
by ﬁscal spending, assume that country H is the creditor: b0 > 0,a n dt h a tt h e
26t w oc o u n t r i e sh a v et h es a m ef e l i c i t yf u n c t i o n ss p e c i ﬁed, as in the literature






where the habit parameter γ ∈ (0,1) captures the strength of habit inﬂuence;







> 0.13 Therefore, from Proposition 4 (ii), an increase in g
necessarily harms the debtor country F.
As for Proposition 4 (i), the condition for the reversed immiserizing
growth eﬀect, i.e., θ




















Note that, as γ → 1, the left hand side of this inequality diverges to inﬁnity
for any parameter values. From Proposition 4 (i), this implies that an in-
crease in g deﬁnitely causes the reversed immiserizing growth eﬀect under a
suﬃciently large habit parameter γ.14
γ








0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5
2.0 2.88 3.92 1.92 2.62 1.21 1.66 0.70 0.98 0.34 0.47 0.11 0.16
ϕ 3.0 0.11 2.51 1.24 1.70 0.79 1.09 0.46 0.64 0.23 0.32 0.08 0.11
4.0 1.35 1.84 0.92 1.26 0.59 0.81 0.35 0.48 0.17 0.24 0.06 0.08
5.0 1.07 1.46 0.73 1.00 0.47 0.65 0.28 0.38 0.14 0.19 0.05 0.07
Table 1: The net foreign assets-GDP ratio b0 required for the reversed
immiserizing growth eﬀect
13Even if the risk aversion parameter ϕ diﬀers between the both countries, the relation,






> 0, is retained. The discussions in this section, therefore,
can be extended without substantial changes to the heterogenous risk aversion cases.
14Gruber (2004) obtains the signiﬁcant estimates of γ as 0.789 to 0.920 from the current
account data of ﬁve advanced countries.
27Corollary 2: Suppose that two countries have the same felicity function
(55); and that country H is the creditor. Then, an increase in country H’s
ﬁscal spending
(i) beneﬁts country H under suﬃciently strong habit formation; and
(ii) necessarily harms country F.
To evaluate tentatively how likely the reversed immiserizing growth eﬀect
occurs, we ﬁgure out the critical values of the net foreign assets-GDP ratio b0
under alternative values of the habit parameter γ, the risk aversion parameter
ϕ, and the initial habit stock z∗
0 of country F, with ﬁxing the parameters y,α,
and θ to y =1 , α =0 .9, and θ =0 .05, respectively. Table 1 summarizes
the results, where each value represents the minimal b0 value required for the
eﬀect under diﬀerent (γ,ϕ,z∗
0) values. As seen from the table, the reversed
immiserizing growth eﬀect is not so implausible. For example, when (γ,ϕ)=
(0.90,3.0), the reversed immiserizing growth eﬀect takes place if the net
foreign assets-GDP ratio b0 is higher than 0.23 when z∗
0 =0 .1 and 0.32 when
z∗
0 =0 .5, both of which are smaller than the Japanese actual data (0.35).15
The critical condition can be even weaker if the risk aversion parameter ϕ is
larger; and/or if the speed of habit formation α is larger.16
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have examined macroeconomic adjustments in a tractable two-country
model of heterogeneous habit forming consumers, thereby ﬁguring out impli-
cations for welfare and for the understanding of some empirical facts. Our
conclusions can be summarized as follows:
1. To focus on interactive consumption-habit dynamics, we have proposed
to construct the world felicity function and the aggregate habit capital,
which successfully help to characterize intertemporal complementarities
in the two-country equilibrium.
15Although Gruber (2004) estimates Japan’s γ as 0.789, it is based on the small country
assumption. Compared with Gruber’s other estimates, the value 0.90 is not unrealistically
high.
16When the felicity function is speciﬁed in the alternative form as u(c,z)=
(c/zγ)
1−ϕ /(1 − ϕ);γ ∈ (0,1), however, the conditions for the reversed immiserizing eﬀect
are much more stict than in the case of (55).
282. External indebtedness depends crucially on international diﬀerence in
surplus income, i.e., the eﬀective net output that can be allocated for
saving under habit formation. This is shown to be consistent with the
existing proposition (e.g., Devereux and Shi 1991) that a country tends
to be a long-run creditor the more patient it is. Our contribution is
that which country is more patient is determined endogenously from the
relative strengths of adjacent complementarity and how much greater
net output than the habitual consumption standard they have.
3. When the initial holding of net foreign assets, and hence the income
re-transfer eﬀect due to interest rate changes are negligible, an increase
in a country’s ﬁscal spending (i) can increase the initial or steady-state
consumption level of that country, with the other country’s consump-
tion being crowded out; (ii), as in the small country case, necessarily
worsens (resp. improves) the steady-state external asset position if the
country’s preference displays adjacent (resp. distant) complementar-
ity, irrespective of the other country’s preferences; and (iii) has long-run
and short-run spill-over eﬀects on the other country’s consumption, de-
pending crucially on whether the policy implementing country displays
adjacent or distant complementarity.
4. With non-negligible initial net foreign assets, an increase in ﬁscal spend-
ing in the creditor country can make the country better oﬀ and the
neighbor debtor worse oﬀ due to the intertemporal terms-of-trade ef-
fect. With a speciﬁc felicity function, this necessarily occurs under
suﬃciently strong habit formation.
5. Interest rate adjustments enlarge the consumption eﬀect of an income
shock and thereby mitigate its current account eﬀect. The habit para-
meter of a large country, therefore, would be underestimated, and the
current account volatility overestimated, if they were measured using
a small-country model as in the literature.
For future research, two issues may be interesting. First, to evaluate
explicitly the eﬀect of habit formation on the current account volatility of a
large country, the analysis should be extended to a stochastic model. Second,
when a government knows that ﬁscal spending causes the reversed immiseriz-
ing growth eﬀect at the loss of the neighbor country’s welfare, some strategic
policy game naturally arises. It should be examined how the game changes
our basic results.
29Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
Note ﬁrst that λ/λ




t from (5). By elim-
inating c∗ and z∗ using (8) and (12) from the foreign counterpart of (4),
combining the resulting equation and (4) yields:
uc (c,z)+αξ
u∗





By totally diﬀerentiating this equation, we obtain:



























We substitute this equation into (1), (6), and the foreign counterpart of
(6) and eliminate c∗ and z∗ using (8) and (12) from the resulting equation.
Then, from (11), the autonomous dynamic equation system with respect to ³




is obtained as follows:















































































































˙ Z = −α ˆ Z.
From the deﬁnitions (13) and (14) of v and ς, respectively, this autonomous
system reduces to (15).
30B Equilibrium solutions
B.1 Dynamics of habit capital z:( 1 8 )
The stable roots of dynamics (15) are given by ω and −α as in (16). Letting
m denote (z,ς,Z)
0, the general solution to (15) can thus be expressed as
ˆ m(t)=A1 exp(ωt)q + A2 exp(−αt)h,
where q ≡ (q1,q 2,q 3)
0 and h ≡ (h1,h 2,h 3)
0 represent the eigen vectors as-
sociated with stable roots ω and −α, respectively. From (15), it is easy to
conﬁrm that q3 =0 . By eliminating A1 exp(ωt) and A2 exp(−αt) from the








where the coeﬃcients of ˆ z and ˆ Z can be obtained by exploiting the deﬁnition









vcc (vczvZZ + vcZvzz)
αvccvzz +( 2 α + δ)vccvcz
+
{(ω + α)vcc + αvcz}{αvccvZZ − (2α + δ)vccvcZ}
α2 (αvccvzz +( 2 α + δ)vccvcz)
.
Substituting (57) into the ˙ z-equation in (15) yields (18).
B.2 The interest rate
From (1) and (4) through (6), the optimal consumption dynamics are given
by




ˆ r − ˆ φ
´
,








31Substitute (21) into the above Euler equation. The resulting equation can
be solved for ˆ r as










In the above, ˆ ξ can be obtained from (14),(19), (56), and (57) as
ˆ ξ = −
uccΩH





Substituting (59) and (20) successively into (58) yields (25).
B.3 Net foreign assets
Set
ˆ b = κ1ˆ z + κ2 ˆ Z. (60)
Diﬀerentiating (60) with respect to time t yields
˙ b = κ1 ˙ z + κ2 ˙ Z. (61)




ˆ rb0 + rˆ b − ˆ c = κ1 ˙ z + κ2 ˙ Z. (62)
Substitute (18), (19), (20), (25), and (60) into (62). By comparing the coef-
ﬁcients of the resulting equation, we obtain
































Substituting (63) and (64) into (60) yields (29).
32B.4 Welfare
To obtain the welfare level of country H, linearize instantaneous utilities
u(ct,z t) around a steady state and substitute the result into the lifetime




{u(¯ c, ¯ z)+ucˆ ct + uzˆ zt}exp(−θt)dt.
Since, from (21) and (1), ˆ ct and ˆ zt are solved as















































The initial optimal consumption ˆ c0 is obtained by setting t =0in (20).
Substituting it into the above equation yields (43). Equation (44) can be
obtained in the same way.
C Dynamics with non-zero b0:T h ei d e n t i c a l
degrees of adjacent complementarity
C.1 Solutions
By assuming that the two countries’ preferences exhibit the identical degrees
of adjacent complementarity, ΩH = ΩF = Ω, we shall derive equilibrium
solutions in the case of a nonzero b0. In this case, from (18), (19), (20), (25),
and (29), the equilibrium dynamics are generated by the following equations
˙ z = ωˆ z − (ω + α)(1 − δ) ˆ Z, (65)






ˆ z − (1 − δ) ˆ Z
´
,
˙ c = ωˆ c,

















(ω + α)uc + αuz
α(θ − ω)
(z0 − ¯ z) (68)
−
(ω + α)(1− δ)
α(θ + α)(θ − ω)






















z](Z0 − Y ),
respectively.
Deﬁne the eﬀective habit stock e as
e ≡ z − (1 − δ)Z. (70)
By using the eﬀective habit stock, the equilibrium dynamics can be summa-
rized as





˙ e = ωˆ e. (72)
Figure 4 illustrates the phase diagram in the (e,b) plane.








34The steady state equilibrium is determined by the following two schedules,
CC0 and DD0:
CC
0: ¯ b − b0 =
ω + α
α(θ − ω)
(¯ e − e0) −
b0ηΩ
θ + α
(Y − Z0), (74)
DD
0: θ¯ b =¯ e +( 1− ε)Y + g − y, (75)
where schedule CC0 is obtained by evaluating (73) at t =0 ;a n dDD0 is
obtained by substituting (70) for ¯ c(= ¯ z) in (34). The two schedules are
illustrated in Figure 4, where schedule CC0 is positively- (resp. negatively-
) sloping when the world felicity function displays adjacent (resp. distant)
complementarity, Ω > 0 (resp. Ω < 0). It can be easily shown that the slope
of schedule DD0 is larger than that of CC0;17 and that, when Ω > 0, schedule
CC0 is steeper than the ˙ b =0schedule which is obtained by setting ˙ b =0in
(71).18 The steady-state equilibrium is determined at the intersection of the
two schedules.
C.2 The eﬀect of ﬁscal spending
The eﬀects of an increase in ﬁscal spending g on ¯ b and ¯ e are obtained from






















As seen by comparing (40) and (76), the ﬁrst terms on the right hand
s i d e si nt h e s ee q u a t i o n sr e p r e s e n tt h es a m ee ﬀects as are discussed in Section
4.2 whereas the second terms capture income eﬀects that arise under non-zero
b0 due to interest rate changes. In fact, diﬀerentiating (50) by g yields
dr(0)
dg
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
= ηΩ, (78)
17The slope of schedule DD0, 1/θ, minus that of CC0, (ω + α)/α(θ − ω),e q u a l s
−ω(θ + α)/αθ(θ − ω),w h i c hi sp o s i t i v e .
18The slope of schedule CC0, (ω + α)/α(θ − ω), minus that of the ˙ b =0schedule,
(ω + α)
2 /α2 (θ − ω),e q u a l s−ω(ω + α)/α2 (θ − ω), which is positive (resp. negative)
when ω + α > 0 (resp. < 0).
35implying that, with adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity, Ω > (resp. <)0,
ceteris paribus an increase in g causes excess demand (resp. supply) for the
present good, and raises (resp. lowers) the interest rate. From (76), there-
fore, when country H is a creditor, b0 > 0, the increase (resp. decrease) in the
interest rate has an additional positive (resp. negative) eﬀect on steady-state
external asset holding of country H. Consequently, in contrast to the case of
az e r ob0, even under adjacent complementarity, an increase in g can enlarge
steady-state external asset holding of country H by increasing interest income
if b0 is positive and suﬃciently large.
Figure 5 illustrates such a case by assuming that Ω > 0 and b0 > 0.A n
increase in ﬁscal spending shifts both the CC0 and DD0 schedules upward.
Due to a dominant interest-income eﬀect, these shifts bring the steady-state
point from E0 to E1 with a higher ¯ b and a lower ¯ e. In transition the eﬀective
habit stock e decreases monotonically whereas net foreign assets increase
non-monotonically.



































in which the last terms on the right hand sides represent the income eﬀect
of interest rate changes. When Ωb0 > 0,a ni n c r e a s ei ng increases country
H’s interest income, thereby having a positive eﬀect on ¯ c and a negative one
on ¯ c∗.
The welfare eﬀects are obtained from (68), (69), (79) and (80) as
dU
dg





























ηΩb0 T 1. (81)
dU∗
dg
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
T 0 ⇔ Ωb0 S 0. (82)
Equations (78) and (81) reveal that an increase in g beneﬁts country H when
t h ei n c o m ee ﬀect of interest rate changes is suﬃciently large. From (78) and
(82), the spill-over eﬀect on country F’s welfare is positive or negative as the
interest rate revenue of country F is enlarged or reduced by the policy. For
example, when country H is a creditor (b0 > 0) and when preferences display
adjacent complementarity (Ω > 0), an increase in g raises the interest rate
and causes income transfers from country F to H. This makes country F
worse oﬀ.I fb0 and/or Ω are/is large enough, the increase in ﬁscal spending
makes country H better oﬀ by raising her interest revenues.
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Figure 1.    Equilibrium dynamics 
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Figure 2. Steady-state equilibrium and the effects of 
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Figure 3. The effects of an increase in fiscal spending when  . 0 > ΩH   
 
 
0 = e &





) 0 ( < Ω  
0 = b &  
 
D




Figure 4. Equilibrium dynamics  
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Figure 5. Effects of an increase in fiscal spending 
when   and  .  0 > Ω 0 0 > b